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The Respondent cites Andala Company v. Ganus, 115 S.2d 123 
(Ala. 1959), Kaylock v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 
Review, 67 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1949) and Sturzebecker v. Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 188 A.2d 782 (Pa. 1963) for the 
proposition that a worker could be denied unemployment benefits 
for a failure to meet the "good cause11 standard when refusing 
to give a new system or assignment a trial period. In Andela, 
the facts established that the worker would be earning about 
the same amount under the new system, and her actual duties and 
skills remained essentially unaffected. The Claimant in the 
instant case faced a substantial reduction in wages (R. 37, 38) 
and would have been performing a job in which she had limited 
experience and few skills (R. 31, 34, 41, 42). In Kaylock, the 
court found that the Claimant's wages would have been 
approximately the same under the new plan as those paid under 
the old method. Since the Claimant would not have suffered a 
substantial reduction in wages, the Court held that he should 
have given the new plan a trial period. In Sturzebecker, the 
court found that the Claimant should have given the new 
assignment a fair trial, especially because the record showed a 
possibility of a greater income in the new position. In the 
present case, the record supports the fact that the Claimant 
faced a high likelihood that her salary would be severely 
reduced (R. 37, 38) from two thousand dollars per month to two 
hundred fifty dollars per month. 
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III. Claimant's Inability to Work Out Her Problems With Bryce 
Constituted Additional Good Cause To Quit. 
The Respondent relies on Uniweld Products, Inc. v. 
Industrial Relations Commission, 277 S.2d 827 (Fla. 1973) and 
Citizen Bank of Shelbyville v. Industrial Commission of 
Missouri 428 S.W. 2d 895 (Mo. 1968) for cases upholding denial 
of unemployment benefits when the Claimants quit due to 
personality conflicts on the job. In the present case, the 
Claimant does not deny that the situation at work was "very 
tense" and that there were "communication problems" between 
Bryce and herself (R. 44, 47). But the record supports the 
fact that the Claimant made several attempts to reconcile these 
concerns in a reasonable manner (R. 31-34, 36, 37) and that the 
continuing hostility between the two made any resolution 
futile. The Respondent contends that the Claimant could have 
"walked out" of the August 5, 1985 final staff meeting rather 
than quit (Respondent's brief, p. 28), and that the Claimant 
had several other alternatives available to her. The Claimant 
did not "walk out" simply because of the argument during the 
staff meeting. The record shows that the company had been 
failing as early as May, 1985 (R. 31, 42), and the Claimant's 
actions in quitting were a result of a prolonged situation of 
unsuccessful attempts to correct both the company's decline and 
the personality problems existing between the Claimant and 
Bryce. The Respondent's argument that the Claimant was overly 
sensitive and unreasonable in quitting—is not an accurate 
characterization of the events surrounding her resignation, nor 
is this argument supported by the record. 
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IV. The Board Applied a Standard of Conduct to Claimant Higher 
Than That Used in Determining Benefits for Other Claimants. 
The Board of Review determined that one of the important 
factors to be considered in this particular case was the fact 
that the Claimant was an officer/vice-president, a member of 
the Board of Directors, and a stockholder in the employer 
corporation (R. 0014). The Board determined that these factors 
amounted to a "proprietary interest" giving rise to a duty 
beyond that of a normal employee. The Board thus held the 
Claimant to a higher than average standard because of her 
interest in the company. Rule A71-07-l:15 (I)(C)(2)(b) states 
that "good cause" and "eguity and good conscience" are to be 
measured in terms of "reasonableness." "The actions which 
might be acceptable for a member of a subculture are not the 
norm by which reasonableness is established" (emphasis added.) 
If the Board of Review's analysis were to be followed, then any 
employee who participated in an employee stock ownership plan 
or otherwise happened to own stock in the employer 
company--would be unfairly held to a higher standard than 
employees who didn't own stock. The result would be unegual 
treatment of similarly situated Claimants, and the Claimant in 
the instant case should not be penalized simply because she had 
an interest in the company. 
V. Conclusion 
As the ALJ and the dissenting member of the Board of 
Review pointed out, the Claimant demonstrated good cause for 
leaving (R. 0015). The ALJ found that the Claimant had left 
work with good cause because of the deteriorating financial 
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situation of the company, the fact that the Claimant's salary 
would be substantially reduced for a time, the communication 
barriers and the inability of the parties to remedy the 
situation (R. 26). The dissenting member of the Board of 
Review noted that: 
The Claimant's salary would have been 
substantially reduced and it was not certain 
when or if the Claimant's income would reach 
its prior level. The company president 
proposed to take from the Claimant the clients 
she had been working with and assign her to 
work with new clients with whom she was not 
familiar. The Claimant had previously been 
assigned nonsales administrative work and felt 
at a disadvantage in competing with other 
employees who had been involved completely in 
sales work. (R. 8, 15). 
For the foregoing reasons, Claimant asks that this Court 
reverse the decision below and enter its judgment that she is 
eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. 
DATED this day of SfM>V , 1986. 
JTAH Q£GAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Claimant-Petitioner 
BY: WAINE RICHES 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF to Winston M. Faux, Counsel for 
Respondent, at 1234 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84147, postage prepaid, this day of Tuly 1986 
fOOAAj &tA4Jk 
